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Abstract 
In countries with relatively small firms, entrepreneurial morality is determined by the in-
fluences that shape the values, the personality and the character of entrepreneurs as owners and 
managers of their enterprises. To shed some light on the processes involved we estimate an or-
dered probit model using data from 1643 enterprises, which were collected in Greece in the spring of 
2006. We find that localized and generalized morality, the family and the educational environment, 
the level of education, the size of firms, and the moral factors that contribute to success in business, 
determine entrepreneurial morality in a statistically significant way. By contrast, even though we ex-
perimented with such other influences as the age of enterprises, the gender of entrepreneurs, the loca-
tion of schools where they grew up, etc., none of them turned out to exert perceptible impacts. 
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1. Introduction  
The contribution of large multi-product enterprises to the introduction and diffusion of in-
novations, the growth in productivity via economies of scale and scope, the expansion of em-
ployment opportunities, etc., at least from the beginning of 1980s began to show signs of severe 
deceleration. In this light many researchers turned their attention to small-scale enterprises, since 
they appeared to be exceptionally dynamic. But at the same time their newfound vitality was ac-
companied by many problems that ought to be confronted, if national economies were to benefit 
significantly. The study of these problems and the policy approaches to alleviate them in general 
and in particular country environments gave rise to a new field, i.e. the field that focuses on the 
economics of Small and Medium-scale Enterprises or SMEs.  
To understand the diversity of issues that are associated with the size of enterprises it is 
convenient to recall the fundamental distinction between ownership and control. In large multi-
product enterprises, for reasons that need not occupy us here, ownership has separated from eve-
ryday administration and control, in the sense that others are the owners and others are those who 
take the decisions and manage their affairs. In turn, this separation, in conjunction with the ob-
servation that decisions in such enterprises affect large groups of stakeholders like employees, 
suppliers, banks, stockholders, etc., brought into the forefront of public interest a large array of 
problems that required the attention of economists, lawyers, politicians, regulatory and other pub-
lic agencies, sociologists, etc. Thus, from their efforts emerged an area of research and educa-
tional activities, as well as applications, which has come to be known in practice and referred to 
in the literature as Corporate Governance.1 
One subject that has attracted particular attention in this field concerns the influences and 
the processes through which they shape the moral conduct of managers and administrators. An 
indication of the keen interest it has attracted is the huge number of papers published in special-
ized journals like The Journal of Business Ethics, The Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and 
Organization Studies, The Journal of Markets and Morality, etc. Another is the number and the 
variety of relevant academic courses offered in the majority of universities; and still a third mani-
festation is the vast amount of laws and institutional arrangements that have been adopted locally 
and internationally in order to safeguard the moral conduct of professional managers. 
                                                 
1 The emphasis we give below to Corporate Governance does not imply that the effects of the nature and structure of own-
ership in large corporations have been ignored in the literature. For a sample from this bibliography, see Bitros (2003).  
  
3
On the contrary, in the field of small and medium size enterprises, in which the operations 
of ownership and control coincide as a rule in the same person, i.e. the entrepreneur,2 our knowl-
edge is scanty. The reason is that, while researchers have conducted extensive inquiries regarding 
the motives, the personality, the objectives, and the strategies of entrepreneurs, the influences and 
the channels through which they shape their moral values have not received attention. To cor-
roborate this claim, it suffices to note the following. As evidenced by the survey paper by Quinn 
(1997, p. 123), the literature that investigates the ethical attitudes of entrepreneurs in relation to 
their gender, age, working environment, and various personality traits is voluminous. Vyakarnam, 
Bailey, Myers, Burnett (1997) examined the ethical dilemmas faced by entrepreneurs and the moral-
ity of their decisions in the light of their working circumstances, values and views about social re-
sponsibility. Solymossy, Masters (2002, pp. 228-9) researched the differences between the entrepre-
neur’s own values and his behavior in confronting various ethical questions in decision making. Mor-
ris, Schindehutte, Walton, Allen (2002) focused on the relationship between the ethical environment 
in a firm and the mechanisms in place to safeguard ethical standards. Several studies have stressed the 
differences that characterize the behavior of entrepreneurs relative to that of managers in large enter-
prises (i.e. Teal, Carroll, 1999; Solymossy, Masters, 2002; Hanaffey, 2003; Bucar, Glas, Hisrich, 
2003, pp. 266-9).  Moreover, Trevino (1992) and Elm, Nichols (1993) looked into the ethical conduct 
of entrepreneurs and managers in relation to the organization of the firm, the nature of the work envi-
ronment, the existence of moral training programs, etc., while Fassin (2005) describes various un-
ethical practices of managers and entrepreneurs and the reasons behind  such  behavior. From this 
brief survey it emerges that there are few studies regarding the formation of entrepreneurial values 
and those that exist stress mainly the influence of religion (i.e. Gay, 2002; Cornwall, Naughton, 2003, 
Dodd-Drakopoulou, Gotsis, 2007, Noble et all. 2007). 
The lack of interest in the determinants of entrepreneurial morality in large countries 
would not be unexpected, since the moral behavior of managers there is shaped by the codes of 
ethics that have been put in place and the institutions of corporate governance to which the re-
sponsibility for their monitoring and enforcement has been assigned. But in countries like Greece, 
where the size of productive and commercial units is predominantly small, the factors and the 
channels through which they determine the moral values of entrepreneurs constitute important is-
                                                 
2 Many studies establish that entrepreneurship constitutes the driving force in small enterprises. For details, see for 
example Brock, Evans (1989).  
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sues. This is so because the morality of entrepreneurs: a) influences their behavior toward consumers, 
employers, other entrepreneurs and the public sector; b) influences the level of morality that prevails 
in society, and c) determines the cost of transactions, tax evasion, corruption and other adverse condi-
tions in business  (see e.g. Yaffey, 1998, Gossling, 2003).3  Hence, the more the relevant literature 
links economic growth to the transparent functioning of markets and institutions, the more the gov-
ernments in small countries should be interested in the factors and processes that shape entrepreneu-
rial morality in order to design and implement effective economic and social policies.    
In light of the preceding remarks, our objective in the present paper is to shed some light 
on the probable forces and processes through which they determine entrepreneurial morality. To 
this end, in the next section we do two things. First, we develop several hypotheses regarding the 
formation of moral norms by individuals in general and entrepreneurs in particular. Given that at 
present there is not a single unified framework for the analysis of the issues involved, we adopt 
an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on related theories from psychology, sociology and 
economics. Secondly, we propose an econometric model, which expectedly upon estimation will en-
able us to test empirically these hypotheses. Section 3 describes the nature of our data as well as the 
definitions and the measurement of the variables that enter into the model in the stage of its estima-
tion. As the data derive from a questionnaire addressed to entrepreneurs in Greece, in the same sec-
tion we take considerable pains to explain our choices regarding the design of the questionnaire, the 
procedures for selecting the subjects of our study, and the conventions used for translating categorical 
into measurable variables.  Then, in Section 4, we describe the estimating methodology and the vari-
ous tests that we performed, taking into consideration that the dependent variable in the model is 
measured on a Likert scale. In Section 5 we present the results from alternative specifications of the 
model and then go on to comment on their statistical properties and interpretations. Finally, in Section 
6, we summarize our findings and make a few suggestions for further research.   
 
2. Towards a theory of entrepreneurial morality  
Economists have worked out theories that are very helpful in understanding the process of 
decision making by economic agents. Unfortunately for entrepreneurial morality no such frame-
work of analysis exists. Consequently, for the time being the only alternative approach consists of 
                                                 
3  Anderson, Smith (2007) provide an interesting discussion regarding the importance of entrepreneurial morality in  
the economy and the society. 
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four tasks. That is, first, to develop certain hypotheses by drawing on the views that have been ex-
pressed regarding the processes by which human beings form their moral values; second, to embed 
these hypotheses into a model capable of confirming or refuting their validity; third, to estimate the 
model with the help of pertinent data and methods; and, lastly, to employ the estimated model to con-
duct a series of tests in the expectation that from their results we will be able to highlight the issues 
under consideration. Here we turn to the first two of these tasks.   
 
2.1 Views and hypotheses about the formation of moral values 
Over the ages the importance of morality in society has been highly contested.  But to our 
minds there has been no better sum-up of where the debate stands than the following passage from a 
fictitious dialogue between Voltaire and Pope Benedict XIV, which according to Durant, Durant 
(1967, IX, p. 791) took place somewhere in the grateful memory of mankind: 
 
Voltaire: I still think that philosophers can dispense with morality. 
Pope Benedict XIV: How naïve you are. Are children capable of philosophy? Can 
children reason? Society is based upon morality; morality is based upon character; 
character is formed in childhood and youth long before reason can be a guide. We 
must infuse morality into the individual when he is young and malleable; then it may 
be strong enough to withstand his individualistic impulses, even his individualistic 
reasoning. I am afraid you began to think too soon. The intellect is constitutional in-
dividualist, and when it is uncontrolled by morality it can tear society to pieces.” 
  
From this it follows unequivocally that morality is an indispensable ingredient for the well being 
of society and that the only open question is to understand and, if possible, identify the processes 
by which it takes roots and flourishes. 
Most informative in the regard are the contributions by Kohlberg (1969, 1973). For they high-
light the processes by which individuals acquire cognitive skills that help them resolve moral dilemmas. 
In particular, drawing on Elm, Nichols (1993, p. 819), Kohlberg’s theory maintains that individuals de-
velop such skill through exposure to education and socialization in levels and stages as follows: 
Preconventional level: Stage 1:  punishment and obedience orientation (will I be caught?). 
                        Stage 2: instrumental relativist orientation (what will I get out of it?). 
Conventional level: Stage 3: good boy/nice girl orientation (be a good person). 
                   Stage 4: law and order orientation (laws promote social welfare). 
Postconventional level: Stage 5: social contact legalism orientation (societal standards 
                                                    apply through consensus). 
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              Stage 6: universal ethical principle orientation (ethical principles  
                                                              chosen regardless of society). 
Presumably the first three stages cover the years of childhood and adolescence. In these 
years individuals form their character by interacting early on with their parents and siblings, and 
subsequently with their friends and fellow students in the school, which is also a period of learn-
ing how to assimilate in groups pursuing various objectives. That is why researchers agree unani-
mously that the environments of family and school, where youngsters spend their formative 
years, are very crucial in acquiring ethical norms to balance their individualistic choices with 
family and group interests.4 Hence, on account of these considerations, we can state the following 
hypotheses with respect to individuals as entrepreneurs: 
 
H.1: Entrepreneurial morality should be positively related to the ethical values that pre-
vail in the family environment in which entrepreneurs spend their formative years.  
 
H.2: Entrepreneurial morality should be positively related to the ethical values taught 
and practiced in the schools where entrepreneurs receive their primary and secon-
dary education. 
 
In other words, given that it is the family and the school to which society entrusts the supreme 
responsibility for providing moral guidance to youngsters, what these hypotheses stake is that the 
morality of those who pursue entrepreneurial activities should be related positively to the moral 
norms that are promoted and enforced by the respective institutions.5  
Stages 4 and 5 in Kohlberg’s schema coincide with the years over which individuals leave 
the protected environments of the family and the school and integrate into the wider society by 
taking hold of their responsibilities and destinies. According to the so-called Integrative Social 
Contract Theory (ISCT), as summarized, for example, in Bucar, Glas, Hisrich (2003), during this 
period individuals come to face with the prevailing social or generalized morality, which is embodied 
in the laws and institutions of society. From this encounter they are bound to develop some degree of 
respect for social arrangements and to determine their behavior accordingly. By implication, this 
analysis leads us to the following hypotheses: 
                                                 
4  A detailed and thorough analysis of this proposition may be found, for example, in McClelland (1961). 
5  Hannafey (2003, p.106) provides qualitative evidence according to which the core values implanted by family members, 
teachers, and mentors early in life may influence or even determine an entrepreneur’s ethical standards. For more evi-
dence on this point, see Teal, Carroll (1999, p. 231), Solymossy, Masters  (2002, pp. 228-9). 
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H.3: For entrepreneurs the state of morality that counts most is the morality that charac-
terizes their close business environment. Therefore, the degree of morality that pre-
vails in their enterprises and the particular markets in which they deal would be ex-
pected to influence entrepreneurial morality perceptively and in the same direction.  
 
H.4: Since entrepreneurs exercise their activities within markets and sectors that are 
embedded in a wider economic and social environment, our expectation is that 
the level of social morality affects entrepreneurial morality significantly.6 But 
we are uncertain regarding the direction of this influence, because of the con-
founding effects of the factors involved.   
 
To explain the last point, it suffices to give an example. According to Bucar, Glas, Hisrich (2003) 
the level of entrepreneurial morality is inversely related to the cost of government because the 
latter aggravates regulation and corruption. On the other hand, Spence, Rutherford (2001) and 
Daly, Mattila (2004) have found that when entrepreneurial morality is in line with social morality 
the rates of survival and growth of enterprises increase. Now assume that in the model it is im-
possible to control for the cost of government. Then the latter’s negative effect would be con-
founded with the positive effect of generalized morality and the net effect on entrepreneurial mo-
rality would depend on which of the two influences would be stronger. But this is an empirical 
question about which nothing can be said on an ex-ante basis.7  
Aside from the preceding, a plethora of other subsidiary factors may influence entrepreneurial 
morality. For example, one may be the age of entrepreneurs, so it would be quite interesting to test for 
the commonly held view that the level of morality from older to younger entrepreneurs declines.  An-
other is the gender of entrepreneurs because, if it were true that female entrepreneurs are character-
ized by higher morality than male entrepreneurs, there would be one additional and indeed good rea-
son for the recent policy initiatives in favor of female entrepreneurship.  And still a third factor may 
be the nature of structural policies pursued by governments, since from the available evidence it tran-
spires that such policies lead to corrupt business practices. In short, in addition to providing the appa-
ratus for testing the four core hypotheses, the model should allow enough flexibility to experiment 
                                                 
6  From Gossling (2003) we know that the morality of entrepreneurs is conditioned by formal and informal structures 
of rules and sanctions, which, as applied by the institutions of society, define the level of social or generalized mo-
rality. Thus this hypothesis is in line with the available literature. But all evidence that corroborates it is qualita-
tive, whereas our objective is to test it empirically.   
7  In addition there is another difficulty. This has to do with the possibility that the influence from generalized to en-
trepreneurial morality may run in both directions. For if, as Payne, Joyner (2006) find, the morality recognized and 
practiced by entrepreneurs is consistent with the generalized morality of their times, then the influence between 
entrepreneurial and generalized morality should be by-directional.    
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with other less important determinants of entrepreneurial morality. 
 
2.2 The theoretical model  
To distinguish on a statistical basis the important from the unimportant determinants of 
entrepreneurial morality, we start by postulating that the morality that characterizes every entre-
preneur i  in our data derives from a model of the following general form:  
 
( , ; , , )i i i i iEM f LM GM EE FE "= ,                                                  (1) 
 
where the various symbols stand as follows:  
         iEM = An index of entrepreneurial morality. 
        iLM  = An index of localized morality, i.e. of morality in the enterprise  
                     and its immediate market environment.  
   iGM = An index of generalized morality, i.e. of morality that prevails in 
society in general.   
          iEE = An index of educational environment in the primary and secondary school.  
          iFE = An index of family environment.  
                  "=Other determinants to be specified later on. 
The question mark in the parenthesis splits the set of explanatory variables into two subsets. The one 
on the left includes variables that are considered endogenous in the sense that they are explained by 
some other equation in the system, whereas the other on the right comprises all variables that are ex-
ogenous and/or predetermined.   
The mathematical form of (1) is unknown. Hence it requires further specifications. To this 
end we hypothesize that f can be approximated by a linear relation, thus leading to the form: 
 
  * *0 1 2 3 4i i i i i iEM a a LM a GM a EE a FE e"= + + + + + + ,                             (2) 
 
in which the revised symbols have the following meanings. First, the variables marked by an as-
terisk are endogenous in the above sense. Second, the vector 0 1 3 4, , , ,a a a a "  denotes the parame-
ters of the model. Third, the three full stops imply that there are more independent variables with 
which we will experiment later on in the estimation stage. Finally, the term te  represents random 
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disturbances caused by a multitude of unknown but less significant influences that are omitted. 
The completion of the model at this point would require the specification of predictions 
regarding the direction of influence of the independent variables. This implies that, by drawing 
on the hypotheses that were developed in sub-section 2.1 above, we would impose some a priori 
restrictions on the signs of the parameters 0 1 3 4, , , ,a a a a " . However, depending on the way that 
iEM  is defined and measured, the interpretation of the parameters in (2) may differ from that in a 
normal regression. This is so because, as we shall argue later on, when the observed values of the 
dependent variable are discrete, the parameters in question do not correspond to the derivatives of 
iEΜ  with respect to the independent variables. For this reason, the discussion of the issues re-
garding the meaning and the direction of influence of independent variables on entrepreneurial 
morality is postponed until the empirical section of the paper.  
Thus, having specified the theoretical model, we are ready to describe the set of our data, 
the procedures that we employed to collect them, and the definition and the measurement of the 
variables that enter into the empirical model in the stage of its estimation. 
 
3. Data, definitions and measurement of variables  
Soon after we conceived of the idea for this paper we became aware from the excellent 
review of behavioral research by Podsakoff, MacKensie, Lee, Podsakoff (2003) that the certainty 
of whatever evidence we obtained regarding the determinants of entrepreneurial morality would 
depend on the quality of the data that we would be able to collect and on the methods by which 
we would estimate and experiment with the model. For this reason, in every step on the way from 
the design of the questionnaire, to carrying out the interviews and controlling the selection of the 
respondents and finally compiling the data and estimating the model, we calibrated our research 
efforts as closely as possible to the best practices. In this section we explain how we collected the 
data and how we define and measure the variables that enter into the estimated model. 
 
3.1 Questionnaire design and implementation   
Our target group was the small and medium-size enterprises in Greece that are managed 
by their owners. Over 170 university students, who attended an undergraduate course in entrepre-
neurship in the spring of 2006, and whom we trained specifically for this task, were involved in 
collecting the data. Each student selected at least 10 enterprises operating mainly in the regions of 
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their origin and described in a term paper how many enterprises were contacted, how many of 
them declined to participate, etc. Our instructions called for the students to select enterprises with 
which they were familiar and had some degree of access to entrepreneurs. Moreover, the enter-
prises that they selected ought to conform, to the extent possible, to the following general criteria: 
a) they preserved the sectoral proportions that prevail in the Gross National Product; (b) at least 
1/3 of the enterprises were established before 1980 (“old” enterprises); (c) the enterprises em-
ployed at least 3 but not more than 100 employees; and (d) at least 1/3 of the enterprises were lo-
cated outside the region of Attica.  
The questionnaire was not administered anonymously because we wished to retain the 
option to validate the participation of the entrepreneurs who were interviewed. However, to en-
courage participation and honesty in the responses, we supplied all respondents with a letter in 
which we pledged our unequivocal commitment to safeguard their identity secret under any cir-
cumstances. Thus, after making sure by random cross-checking that the sampled entrepreneurs 
had been interviewed precisely as reported by the students involved, and after eliminating 85 
questionnaires that came from enterprises employing less than 3 and more than 99 employees, 
we ended up with 1643 questionnaires that satisfied roughly the above mentioned criteria. 
However despite the large size of the sample and the meticulous attention we paid to detail, a 
word of caution is in order. This is that we may have escaped the bias of self-selection, but per-
haps not of common method, because all our data come from a uniform questionnaire and a 
uniform interviewing process across all sampled entrepreneurs.  
Next, with respect to the structure of the questionnaire, we realized that the studies of 
morality in large enterprises follow two approaches. On the one hand, there are those that in-
vestigate the ethics of applied policies, which are action-based in the sense that they are con-
cerned with the ethical nature of the activities of managers, whereas on the other there are the 
studies which are agent-based in the sense that they investigate the moral attitudes and be-
havior of managers themselves. At an early stage we adopted the first approach because we 
believed that it would provide us with relatively objective information. Thus, we constructed 
a questionnaire with questions intended to trace the effect of entrepreneurial actions on such 
variables as advertising, the pricing of goods and services, the relations with workers and 
employees, the relations with suppliers and banks, and other similar activities. But after ap-
plying it to a small sample of entrepreneurs, we concluded that their responses involved seri-
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ous gaps and contradictions and switched to the second approach. In doing so we were en-
couraged also by the thought that this approach links with the philosophical foundations of 
ethical theory, according to which individuals tend to respond favorably when the behavior 
by others is in line with such virtues as fairness, integrity, consistency, wisdom, temperance 
and courage, and loyalty (see Dobson, 2004). 
 To conclude, given that: a) the sample covers a large number of enterprises dispersed 
throughout Greece; b) the interviews were conducted by a large number of students trained for 
this task; and c) the interviewing process was implemented as planned, we trust that the quality of 
the collected data is sufficiently good to support the estimation of the model and the tests of the 
hypotheses to be performed with it. 
 
3.2 Basic characteristics of the sample  
According to provisional data, 3,3% of the Gross Domestic Product in Greece in 2006 
was contributed by the primary sector, 20,7% by the secondary sector, and 76% by the tertiary 
sector. The corresponding structure of our sample is as shown in Table 1. Comparing the latter 
data with the ones from the national income accounts, we observe that they coincide with regard 
to the relative contributions by the three sectors. In particular, the sector of services ranks first, 
followed by manufacturing and agriculture in the same order. However, the absolute percentages 
of the contributions differ as our sample is biased towards the small and medium-size enterprises, 
which are more numerous in agriculture and manufacturing than in services, but due to their lim-
ited size they do not contribute as much to the Gross National Product.  
The regional distribution of the enterprises in the sample is shown in Table 2. From this it 
turns out that 65,3% of them comes from the region of Attica, 31% from other regions of the 
country, and the remaining 3,7% originates in Cyprus. This particular variation in the sample is 
important because it may enable us to trace the effects of independent variables on entrepreneu-
Table 1 
Sectors of economic activity Answers  % 
Primary 187 11,4 
Secondary 523 31.8 
Tertiary  933 56,8 
 Total  1663 100,0 
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rial morality in three regional economies that have a high rate of growth and considerable eco-
nomic independence, i.e. those of Athens, Crete and Cyprus. 
How the enterprises in the sample are distributed on the basis of the year they were estab-
lished is shown in Table 3.  From this it turns out that 35,9% was founded in the decade 1995-
2006, 30,5% in the decade 1994-1985, and 12,6% in the decade 1984-1975. Moreover, in order 
to discriminate between “old” and “new” entrepreneurs, we assumed that 1980 was a reasonable 
cut-off year, because it was close to 30 years of working life, after which normally entrepreneurs 
withdraw. On this basis, 371 enterprises (22,6%) were deemed to belong to “old” entrepreneurs, 
whereas the 1272 (77,4%) were presumed to represent “new” entrepreneurs. 
Table 2 
 Regional distribution  Answers %  
Village  125 7,6 
Small city 140 8,5 
City 161 9,8 
Athens 1072 65,3 
Crete  84 5,1 
Cyprus  61 3,7 
Total 1643 100,0 
Table 3 
Distribution by 
year of establishment Answers  % 
2000-2006 297 18,1
1995-1999 292 17,8
1990-1994 250 15,2
1985-1989 251 15,3
1980-1984 174 10,6
1975-1979 133 8,1
1970-1974 74 4,5
1965-1969 53 3,2
1960-1964 48 2,9
1955-1959 21 1,3
1950-1954 20 1,2
1945-1949 13 0,8
1940-1944 2 0,1
<1940 15 0,9
Total 1643 100,0
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Table 4 depicts the composition of the sample from the point of view of the educational 
level of the entrepreneurs. From this we surmised that their education was significantly above 
average in comparison to total population. In particular, whereas 44,2% held university level de-
grees and 14,1% had finished technical schools, according to the national statistics of 2001 in the 
total population only 10,1% had obtained university level education (3, 10% technical university 
and 8,3% university). Moreover, it is interesting to note that the sample comprises 1231 men 
(74,9%) and 412 (25,1%) women. This indicates that, contrary to the low percentages of women 
that are active as managers in larger firms and corporations, female entrepreneurship in small to 
medium-size firms is rather high in Greece. 
For reasons that will become obvious shortly and have to do with the values of the entre-
preneurs, it is also of interest to display their distribution on the basis of the location in which 
they spent their formative years. As we observe from Table 5, 32,8% of them grew up in villages 
and small cities, while the rest 67,2% were raised in the region of Attica or in large cities. 
     Table 5 
Grew-up in: Answers  %  
Village 387 23,5
Small city  152 9,3
Large city  481 29,3
Attica 623 37,9
 Total 1643 100,0
Table 4 
Distribution by 
educational level Answers % 
Gymnasium  255 15,5 
Lyceum  430 26,2 
Technical School 232 14,1 
Technical University 215 13,1 
University 511 31,1 
 Total 1643 100,0 
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Finally, in Table 6 it is seen that half of the entrepreneurs in the sample grew up in re-
gions that had commerce as their basic wealth-producing activity, whereas the percentages of 
entrepreneurs from rural areas and regions with manufacturing activities were 30,5% and 
7,1%, respectively.  
 From the above it follows that our sample is composed of entrepreneurs with the following 
characteristics: (a) They are active mostly in the sector of services with emphasis on commerce; (b) 
they exercise their entrepreneurial activities mainly in the region of Athens; (c) they are relatively 
young in the sense that they started their enterprises after 1980; (d) they have to a large extent univer-
sity level education; (e) they grew up in Athens or in large urban centers; and, finally, (f) although 
male entrepreneurs dominate the sample, the percentage of female entrepreneurs is by no means low.  
 
3.3 A methodological note   
The questionnaire provided us with two types of information. The first was information that 
could be quantified using the scale of absolute numbers. Such was, for example, the number of work-
ers employed. This could be measured by reference to the scale of absolute numbers because, if en-
terprises A and B employ 5 and 10 workers, respectively, we can say not only that B employs more 
workers than A, but also that B employs two times as many workers as A. On the contrary, the sec-
ond type of information related to the views that entrepreneurs hold with regard to moral judgments 
and other non-quantifiable attributes. In behavioral research the latter are measured with the help of 
various scales. In our analysis we shall use the Likert scale.  To define it, consider the responses that 
can be categorized as: very successful-moderately successful-not successful-moderately unsuccess-
ful-very unsuccessful. A Likert scale would amount to associating with these categories the numbers 
5 4 3 2 1. This clarification is of importance for at least the following two reasons.  
First, observe that the numbers 5 4 3 2 1 represent an ordinal level of measurement, i.e. 
Table 6 
Distribution by 
sector of activity Answers   %  
Tourism  157 9,6 
Manufacture 116 7,1 
Agricultural  500 30,4 
Merchant marine 45 2,7 
Commercial  825 50,2 
 Total 1643 100,0 
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they are inherently ordered, because they imply that a respondent ranks a characteristic in higher 
or lower order than another. But the numbers in this series do not measure the extent of differ-
ences from one category to another. More specifically, while the numbers 5 and 4 would show 
that one entrepreneur is more successful than another, their difference does not indicate how 
much more successful is the former entrepreneur in comparison to the latter.  Thus, given that 
econometricians have developed special methods for the estimation of models where the meas-
urement of the dependent variable receives discrete values, in the present paper we will use the 
method of Ordered Probit, the properties of which will be explained in Section 4.  
The second reason that makes the adoption of a Likert scale useful for the measurement of 
categorical variables is that it allows the flexibility of grouping several Likert indices that measure 
various aspects of the same variable into a single index. For an example, consider the measurement of 
entrepreneurial morality and assume that its level is reflected in the views of entrepreneurs with re-
gard to taxation as well as the behavior of their competitors and customers. If through the question-
naire we obtain the responses of entrepreneurs to three relevant questions, there will result three 
Likert scales, which may be grouped to derive a composite index of entrepreneurial morality. A usual 
mechanism of grouping Likert scales is summation and this explains why frequently they are called 
summative scales. Another mechanism of grouping such scales is the method of Factor Analysis, 
which is applied as follows. Let the index of entrepreneurial morality iM  take on values that depend 
on the responses of entrepreneur i  to three relevant questions. If these responses correspond to the 
Likert scales, ,  and t t tX Y Z , then we may postulate that:  
 
ˆ ( , , )i i i iM g X Y Z= .                                                                   (3) 
 
This equation gives the value of the variable ˆ tM  as a function of the variables ,  and i i iX Y Z . But 
the former variable is unobserved. Hence, the problem is to find an index of the variable ˆ iM  that 
would explain in the best possible way the combined influence of the three variables. This prob-
lem constitutes a case in variable reduction and is carried out in two steps. In the first step we ap-
ply Factor Analysis on the variables ,  and i i iX Y Z  to calculate the so-called Load Factors. Let us 
assume that the latter are depicted by the parameters ,  και X Y Za a a .  In the second stage, using the 
three variables in combination with the Load Factors we compute the expression: 
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t X t Y t Z tM a X a Y a Z= + + ,                                                       (4) 
 
where tM is an observable index of the unobservable variable ˆ tM . 
  In the next section we shall explain how the above technique is employed to derive indices 
for the latent variables in the model. But before turning to this task, an important remark is in order. 
In Section 2 we postulated that by drawing on various strands of relevant literature it is possible to 
test the hypotheses H.1-H.4 by setting up a framework of analysis like equation (2). By the stan-
dards of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), as described, say, by Stevens (1996, p.389), this 
would be methodologically sound if there existed a strong theoretical and/or empirical foundation 
that allowed us to specify in advance an exact model of the processes and the elementary forces 
that shape entrepreneurial morality. But as we argued in the introduction and it turned out from 
the ensuing presentation this is hardly the case, and hence, the grounds for adopting equation (2) 
are feeble. Moreover, since our prior knowledge regarding the factors that load onto 
,  ,  ,   and i i i i iEM LM GM EE FE  is weak, the same limitation applies by postulating equation (3) in 
order to derive indices for the latent variables in the model. The only difference in this case being that, 
by combining equations (3) and (4) we can apply Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to test for the de-
gree to which the measured variables used in the estimations represent the hypothesized constructs that 
appear in equation (2). These are the methodological uncertainties that explain why in the title of the 
paper we refer to the results not as evidence, but as indications about entrepreneurial morality in Greece.  
 
3.4 Definition and measurement of variables.  
 As indicated above, the dependent and most of the independent variables in equation (2) 
are unobserved. Hence, they must be approximated with the help of relevant information from the 
responses of the entrepreneurs in the sample. But for each of these variables relevant information 
can be extracted from more than one response, because some questions were structured so as to 
highlight different aspects of the same variable. Hence, unless stated otherwise, in order to meas-
ure the latent variables ,  ,  ,   and i i i i iEM LM GM EE FE , we applied Factor Analysis by combining 
expressions (3) and (4) in an exploratory fashion. The results are presented below. 
 
The variable of entrepreneurial morality, iEM  
The level of entrepreneurial morality iEM  is determined by two indices that spring from the 
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responses to two separate questions. In the first of them we asked the respondents to describe the 
attitude of Greek entrepreneurs regarding tax evasion. More specifically, we asked them to char-
acterize it from an ethical standpoint as: a) clever, b) defensive and justified, and c) absolutely 
reprehensible. As the question was indirect and did not aim to trace the view about tax evasion of 
the respondents themselves, we expected that we would be able to construct a rather accurate 
measure of the moral stance of entrepreneurs in Greece. This index, labeled 32X , receives the 
values 1 (clever), 2 (defensive and justified) and 3 (absolutely reprehensible).  
In the second question we asked the entrepreneurs to rate A (high), B (medium), and C (low) 
several behavioral characteristics for their contribution to success in business. The characteristics 
were: 271X -honesty, 272X -diligence, 273X -morality, 274X -good relations with employees and custom-
ers, 275X -trustworthiness, 276X -party connections, 277X -social connections, 278X -accountability, and 
279X -opportunistic behavior. Then, we associated with the above rankings the scale 2 (high), 1 (me-
dium) and 0 (low); and, finally, by excluding the indices 274 276 277,  ,  and  X X X  on the grounds that 
they did not represent characterizations of distinct ethical values, we summed the remaining indices and 
obtained 27X  as a second proxy of entrepreneurial morality.
8 
To test the robustness of the results to the definition and measurement of this critical vari-
ables, in the estimation we experimented with two specifications. In the first one we set 
27 32iEM X X= +  and in the second we merged 27X  and 32X  into a single index following the 
above technique. Both gave roughly the same results. But on statistical grounds the results from 
the former specification were slightly better. For this reason, we report the estimates only from 
the first specification. 
 
The variable of localized morality, iLM    
The morality that prevails in the immediate or local business environment is approximated 
by two indices. The first of them, labeled 29X , is based on the cost in terms of the time that entre-
preneurs in small and medium scale enterprises devote for monitoring the ethical behavior of their 
employees, suppliers and customers, as well as for enforcing sanctions in case of transgressions. 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that the two- and three-digit subscripts of variables correspond respectively to the number of 
questions in the questionnaire and the order of items included in them.  The questionnaire is available on request 
by the authors.  
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To construct it, we asked the sampled entrepreneurs to rate the time they spend in these functions 
as: a) very high, b) quite high, and c) low, and then associated with them the scale 1, 2, 3.  
As for the second index, labeled 30X , this was built from the answers to a question whether 
the respondents were more or less willing to pay their taxes when they founded their enterprises rela-
tive to the time of the survey. Since the question addressed directly the tax-paying attitudes of the en-
trepreneurs themselves, but referred to how these attitudes had evolved since past times, this index is 
a lagged proxy of the index 32X , and as such it could be viewed as a particularly dynamic determi-
nant of localized morality.  
  
The variable of generalized morality, iGM   
To capture the influences on entrepreneurial morality of generalized morality, we con-
structed five indices, labeled 21X , 23X , 24X , 34X and 35X . The rationale for adopting the index 21X is 
found in the literature where it is argued that the society and its institutions influence entrepreneurial 
morality.9 To construct it we asked the respondents to tell us what they thought about the view of the 
general public regarding unethical economic transactions. In particular, we asked them to express 
their opinion by selecting one of the following alternatives: a) the society is strongly opposed; a) the 
society is moderately tolerant; and c) the society is quite tolerant. Thus, we built 21X  by making use 
of the scale: 3, for strongly opposed, 2, for moderately tolerant, and 1, for quite tolerant.  
            Next, to gain some insight into the status of entrepreneurs in their communities, we asked 
the ones in the sample to describe how people in their immediate business and family environ-
ments perceived them as individuals. More specifically, we asked them to select one from the fol-
lowing characterizations: a) 241X -suspect; b) 242X -exploiters; c) 243X -creative; d) 245X -individuals 
who contribute to economic development, and e) 245X -tax dodgers. To these five categories we 
assigned the values: 0, for suspect, exploiters and tax dodgers, and 1, for creative individuals and 
individuals who contribute to economic growth. So, this index is defined as 
24 241 242 245 243 2440*( ) 1*( )X X X X X X= + + + +  and takes the values 0 and 1.  
To get a glimpse into the status of entrepreneurs in Greek society, we asked two ques-
tions. In the first we asked them to tell us how they believe they are viewed as individuals by se-
                                                 
9 Cf., as an example, Clarke, Aram (1997), Machan (1999), Buchholz, Rosenthal (2005). 
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lecting three out of the following seven characterizations: a) 351X - swindlers; b) 352X - intelligent; 
c) 353X - progressive; d) 354X - exploiters; e) 355X - hard-working; f) 356X - lazy, and g) 357X - au-
thoritarian; Thus, by adopting the scale: 2, for intelligent, progressive and hard-working, 1, for 
exploiters and authoritarian, and 0, for swindlers and lazy, we derived this index as 
35 352 353 345 354 357 351 3562*( ) 1*( ) 0*( )X X X X X X X X= + + + + + + . As for second question, this was 
intended to measure the degree of approval by society of the entrepreneurial profession. For this rea-
son we asked the respondents to select one from the following choices: a) high approval; b) moderate 
approval; c) low approval; and d) no approval whatsoever. So, by associating with the latter choices 
the numerical scale 3, 2, 1, 0, we arrived at index 23X . 
Lastly, the index 34X  was designed to capture the influence on entrepreneurial morality of 
public policies and emanates from a question that we put to the respondents to characterize those 
whom they think that benefit from state subsidies. The items from which they chose were: a) 341X - 
the active and innovating entrepreneurs; b) 342X -the dishonest; c) 343X - those with party connec-
tions; d) 344X - those with social connections; e) 345X -those who employ corruptive means. In turn, 
by adopting the scale: 2, for active and innovative entrepreneurs, 1, for entrepreneurs with party and 
social connections, and 0, for those entrepreneurs that are dishonest and get involved in corruptive 
activities, we defined this index as 34 341 343 344 342 3452* 1*( ) 0*( )X X X X X X= + + + + . 
 
The variable of educational environment, iEE   
In order to trace the influence of primary and secondary education on entrepreneurial moral-
ity, we asked the respondents to answer several related questions. In one we asked them to character-
ize the nature of the place where they grew up. The choices were: a) 131X -Village; b) 132X -Small ur-
ban center; c) 133X -Large urban center, and d) 132X -Capital. From the answers we defined the index 
13 131 133 134 1343* 2*( ) 1*X X X X X= + + + in the expectation that it might represent adequately the in-
fluences on the character of the entrepreneurs of the closeness or openness of the social environment 
where they spent their formative years. In another question we asked whether the entrepreneurs had 
received adequate moral guidance during their elementary and high school education. From the an-
swers we built index 16X , which takes the values 3, for strong moral guidance; 2, for moderate moral 
guidance; and 1, for no moral guidance at all. Last, but not least, we asked the sampled entrepreneurs 
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to rank the severity of disciplinary practices they had been subjected to in the schools they had at-
tended for moral transgressions. The choices were 1 (none), 2 (moderate), and 3 (very stiff) and from 
their answers we constructed index 19X .  
 
The variable of family environment iFE  
 In the pilot application we realized that it was rather impossible to obtain good quality 
information regarding the family environment of entrepreneurs. For this reason in the main 
application we concentrated exclusively on questions regarding the assistance entrepreneurs 
received from their families, how they had acquired their enterprises, which were their plans 
for the future, etc. From their responses to this group of questions we composed several indi-
ces. Two of them, labeled 16X  and 25X , were selected as determinants of the family influence. 
The former indexes the nature of the assistance entrepreneurs received from their families, 
with choices from the scale: a) material, b) moral, c) both, and d) none at all, whereas the lat-
ter addresses the encouragement entrepreneurs were prepared to offer to their children to be-
come entrepreneurs.    
 
Other relevant variables  
In the estimation we investigated also the impact of several other factors. For example, we 
experimented with the age of the enterprises, the number of employees as a measure of enterprise 
size, the gender of entrepreneurs, etc. Our grounds for introducing these variables into the model 
could be traced to various stands of relevant literature documenting their importance as determi-
nants of entrepreneurial morality. But as most of them failed to meet the standard criteria for sta-
tistical significance, it is unnecessary to describe their construction in more details.    
 
4.  The empirical model and its estimation 
To find out whether the data confirm hypotheses H.1-H.4 or not, model (2) required some 
further specifications. In particular, in order to obtain reliable estimates of its parameters, it was 
necessary to ascertain that the error terms ie  are distributed according to the standard normal dis-
tribution, which implies that the error terms must not be correlated with the independent vari-
ables. But in studies like ours, which are based on data extracted from questionnaires, the risk is 
ever present that this condition may be violated, because of possible biases from such anomalies 
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as self-selection, common method variance, and other sources. Hence, aside from the precautions 
in the data collection stage, we were on guard during estimation to apply appropriate remedies. 
The objective here is to explain how we confronted these concerns.  
 
4.1 The estimated model 
Since entrepreneurial morality is measured on a Likert scale, following Green (1997, pp. 
927-930), the appropriate econometric method of estimation is the Ordered Probit (OP). For 
model (2) this method is based on a regression of the type: 
 
* *
0 1 2 3 4
ˆ
i i i i i i i iEM a a LM a GM a EE a FE e eX"= + + + + + + = +′θ ,                     (5) 
 
where ′θ is a line vector of parameters ia , iX  is a column vector of independent variables for en-
trepreneur i, and for the random errors it holds that (0,1)ie N∼ ; Moreover, while the value 
of ˆ tEM  is unobservable, from the sample we observe the following values: 
 
1
1 2
11
ˆ2 if               (1)
ˆ3  if <        (2)
..........................................
ˆ13 if ,         (12)
i i
i i
i i
EM EM
EM EM
EM EM
μ
μ μ
μ
= ≤
= ≤
= ≤
                                           (6) 
 
where the variables 1 2 11, ,...,μ μ μ  stand for certain unknown limits of change (thresholds) of the 
dependent variable,10 the factors of which are to be estimated simultaneously with the parameters 
of the model. In particular, by applying the estimating technique of maximum likelihood, we ob-
tain the model: 
 
* *
0 1 2 3 4 1 2 11
        + .
i i i i i n i
i i i
EM a a LM a GM a EE a FE e
eX + I M
" "β μ β μ β μ= + + + + + + + + + +
= ′ ′ 1 2θ              (7) 
 
In this Ι′ is a line vector of parameters iβ  and iM  is a column vector of variables iμ . Then, with 
the estimates of the slope coefficients for the variables iX  and iM  in hand, it is relatively easy to 
                                                 
10 The subscripts of the threshold variables index the number of discrete values assumed by iEM . In particular, as 
shown in expression (6), this variable receives integer values from 2 to 13. 
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calculate the probabilities for the index of entrepreneurial morality to receive given values. Since 
the cumulative normal distribution is given by )i iXφ( ′−θ , the probabilities for various values of 
the dependent variable are obtained as follows: 
1
2 1
3 2
11
Prob[ 2] )
Prob[ 3] ) )
Prob[ 4] ) )
.......................................................................
Prob[ 13] 1 ).
i i
i i i
i i i
i i
EM
EM
EM
EM
X
X X
X X
X
φ μ
φ μ φ μ
φ μ φ μ
φ μ
= = ( ′
= = ( (′ ′
= = ( (′ ′
= = ( ′
− θ
− θ − − θ
− θ − − θ
− − θ
                               (8)  
 
Finally, in the light of the above specifications, the following remarks are in order.  
 (1) Model (5) is deduced from model (2) in which the variables *iLM  and 
*
iGM  may be 
endogenous. Thus proper estimation requires the adoption of an instrumental variables approach. 
In doing so *iLM  and 
*
iGM  were regressed on several exogenous variables, and then, their fitted 
values fiLM  and  
f
iGM  were inserted back into (5) and the latter was estimated anew by apply-
ing the ordered probit estimator.  
 (2) The interpretation of the slope coefficients in equation (5) is different than that of the 
slope coefficients in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The reason is that in the probit model the ef-
fect of a change in an independent variable on the probability of the dependent variable to assume 
a given value is not represented by the corresponding slope coefficient, but by the expression: 
 
1 1*
Prob( ) [ ) )]i j i j i
i
EM j a
LM
θ X Xϕ μ ϕ μ +∂ = = ∗′ ′∂ ( − − ( − θ  ,                             (9) 
 
where ϕ  is the density of the normal distribution. From this it can be observed that the effect de-
pends not only on the value of *iLM but also on all other independent variables. This explains 
why Hoetker (2007, p.334) suggested that in computing equation (7) the best practice is to iden-
tify meaningful values for all other independent variables. However, since in the present case any 
such values might be considered arbitrary, we shall adopt the common practice by setting the 
other independent variables at their mean values.  
 (3) Unlike OLS, in the context of probit the marginal effect on iEM of an interaction be-
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tween, say,  and i iEE FE  is not the coefficient of a variable composed by their cross product. To 
see it, observe from the following mathematical expression of the interaction that the magnitude 
and even the sign of the marginal effect can differ across observations. 
 
2 2Prob( ) )) ) )i ii i i
i i i i
EM j
EE FE EE FE
XX θ X Xϕ ϕ∂ = ∂ ′= (′ ′ ′∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
(θ(θ − (θ• • .                      (10) 
 
 (4) The goodness-of-fit statistic in the probit model is not analogous to the coefficient of 
determination in the OLS. In the context of the probit model the literature offers a wide range of 
2pseudo-R  measures, based on different formulae and resulting in different values for the same 
model. Consequently, the results will be reported and the inferences will be derived subject to the 
formula reported for this statistic by the econometric package STATA.  
In short, equation (5) is estimated with the help of consistent systems techniques using the 
ordered probit estimator. Moreover, to make sure that the results are free from the customary bi-
ases that beset such types of research, we carry out the following tests. 
 
4.2 Testing for selectivity 
As we indicated in the previous section, the enterprises that participated in the survey 
were chosen by a large body of students from various regions in Greece and had to conform to 
certain general criteria. By implication, the magnitude of self-selection would be reflected in the 
percentage of enterprises that were contacted but declined to take part in the survey. To get an 
indication of this percentage, we looked in the term papers where the students were required to 
report all enterprises that they had contacted. From this investigation it turned out that the frac-
tion of decliners was very small and that the sample might be free of self-selection bias. But this 
was only an indicative test and hence hardly reassuring. For this reason, in order to determine the 
presence of and to correct for self-selection bias, we perform a test based on Heckman’s (1979) 
two-step procedure, as it was extended by Greene (1998) to allow for an ordered probit in the 
second stage. More specifically, this is how we proceeded.   
In the spring semester of 2008 we repeated the sampling procedure anew, using essen-
tially the same questionnaire, but with a different group of students. This time we collected 644 
responses from owners-entrepreneurs of SMEs that had not been included in the 2006 sample. 
  
24
Thus, assuming that the 2008 sample is representative of the enterprises that were omitted from 
the 2006 sample, in the first step we estimate a binary probit model for survey participation using 
the observations from both samples. This model takes the form:  
 
ˆ
i ι iS u= ′ +γ Ζ  ,                                                                (11) 
 
where 1iS =  if a firm participated and 0 otherwise; ′γ  is a line vector of parameters iγ ; ιΖ  is a col-
umn vector of exogenous variables for entrepreneur i, and iu  stands for random errors having the 
standard normal distribution. In addition, we adopted the following assumptions: a) the variable iEM  
satisfies the ordered probit specification of equation (5) and is observed if and only if 1iS = ; b) the 
variables in the column vectors  and  i iX Z  are always observed; c) the error terms iu are independent 
of the variables in  and  i iX Z  and follow the standard normal distribution. From these assumptions it 
can be shown that, when 1iS = , the expectation E( /i iu Z )  is the inverse Mills ratio, ( )iZ λ − ′γ . In 
turn, this leads to the following outcome equation using the data from the 1643 questionnaires: 
 
E / , 1i i i i i iEM λλ δ( = ) + + (− )′ ′ ′Z S = X I M Ζ θ γ .                                    (12) 
 
To determine if there is evidence of selection bias we conduct a t-test of the coefficient of the in-
verse Mills ratio. If 0λδ ≠ , there is evidence of sample selection bias, and hence, the presence of 
the Mills ratio in the estimated model captures the impact of this bias in the results. 
 
4.3 Controlling for common method bias 
 The best practice in this front recommends various procedural and statistical remedies. In 
line with the former, we adopted four different approaches. First, in our letter we assured the re-
spondents about our commitment to safeguard their identity and invited them to answer the ques-
tions as honestly as possible. Second, to minimize the likelihood that the respondents might fall 
into a pattern linked to Likert or semantic differential scales, we interspersed the open-ended 
questions throughout the questionnaire. Third, a few questions were purposely expressed in posi-
tive and negative ways and the answers were checked for consistency by reverse coding. Finally, 
in the measurement of variables, we varied the anchors and the endpoints of the Likert scales and 
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avoided using bipolar numerical scale values (e.g. -2 to +2). However, given that we could not 
gauge with confidence the effectiveness of these precautionary procedures, in addition we con-
ducted Harman’s single-factor test.  
The results of the tests regarding self-selection bias and common method variance are 
presented in the next section together with the coefficient estimates of the model and other test 
statistics. In the same place we comment on the robustness of the results and their implications 
for entrepreneurial morality in small countries like Greece.  
 
5. Results and interpretations  
According to Harman’s test, if common method variance were a serious problem, we 
would observe either a single factor to emerge from factor analysis or one general factor to ac-
count for the most of the covariance in the dependent and independent variables.  To this end, we 
performed factor analysis on all variables, extracting six factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one. Moreover, from this analysis it turned out that no general factor was apparent in the unro-
tated factor structure, with Factor 1 accounting for less than 11%. Therefore, in the light of these 
findings we were encouraged to conclude that our procedures before collecting the data, i.e. dur-
ing the phases of the design and implementation of the questionnaire, as well as after collecting 
the data, have not introduced common method biases that would be of major concern.   
Next, with regard to the selectivity test, we proceeded as follows. First, we formed the Z  
vector by excluding from the right-hand side of equation (5) the variables * * and i iLM GM  that may 
be endogenous. Then, using the entire 2287 observations in the 2006 and 2008 samples we esti-
mated the binary probit model (11) for the purpose of computing the inverse Mills ratio. This was 
our selection equation and we retained in it only those exogenous variables that performed best on 
the basis of statistical significance. Finally, with the inverse Mills ratio in hand, we estimated the 
outcome equation by applying the ordered probit estimator to the 1643 observations of the 2006 
sample, while replacing the endogenous variables with their fitted values  and f fi iLM GM . The re-
sults are exhibited in Table 7. From the last row in the coefficient section of the outcome equation we 
observe that the coefficient of Lambda is not different from zero, thus implying that there is no evi-
dence of selection bias in our 2006 sample. Hence, on the above grounds, we went ahead and esti-
(Please insert Table 7 about here) 
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mated model (12) without the last term.    
Table 8 presents two sets of results. The first was obtained by replacing the variables in 
question with their fitted values,  and f fi iLM GM , whereas in the second set the same variables 
were treated as exogenous. On observation it turns out that the estimates of equation (12.1) in the 
top-half of Table 8 have significantly higher explanatory power than those of equation (12.2) in the 
bottom-half of the table. But when we move from equation (12.1) to equation (12.2) the coeffi-
cients of the variables for localized morality and family environment turn from negative to positive. 
With the exception of this instability, both equations indicate that the main determinants of entre-
preneurial morality are in line with the hypotheses H.1-H.4. More specifically, in addition to the 
level of education and the social esteem for the entrepreneurial profession, both equations show 
that localized morality, generalized morality and the environments of education and family influ-
ence significantly entrepreneurial morality. On the contrary, such variables as the size of the en-
terprise, the age and the gender of the entrepreneurs, the role of government policies, etc, did not 
appear to exert significant impact. These are among the major findings of this paper.  
Now, if we select (12.1) as the estimates of choice for (12), the next task is to highlight 
the inferences to which they lead. To this end the expressions in (8) provide a convenient means 
to compute the probabilities with which the dependent variable assumes various values. The cal-
culation of these probabilities is based on the values of the threshold variables 1 2 11, ,μ ...  and 
the value of the cumulative normal distribution ( )φ θ X′  for a typical entrepreneur. Let the latter be 
characterized by the mean values of the variables:  
 
1.17406fiLM      2.29187fiGM  1.440764iEE     .3744276iFE      
3.180767 iLED      1.601948iPEP  7.437614iFPS  
 
Using them in conjunction with the coefficients from equation (12.1), we find .61622632′θ X = . Fi-
nally, since iEM  assumes integer values between 2 and 13, applying (8) yields the probabilities 
shown in Figure 1 below. From them, in conjunction with the observation that the weighted average 
index of morality for the typical or representative entrepreneur in our sample is 10 (see the vertical 
(Please insert Table 8 about here) 
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arrowed line), we find that this entrepreneur: a) has a probability of 26.9% to be characterized by 
average morality; b) has only a 4.1% probability to be characterized by an index of morality higher 
than 10, and c) the probability that he may be characterized by morality lower than 10 is 70%. There-
fore, the feeling that prevails among citizens that entrepreneurial morality in Greece is very low 
is remarkably consistent with the results from the estimated model. 
Next, let us turn to the interpretation of the slope coefficients, which as was hinted to pre-
viously, do not correspond to the derivative of the dependent with respect to each of independent 
variables. To this effect, consider the influence on entrepreneurial morality of the generalized 
morality and the educational and family environments. If with the help of expression (9) we calculate 
in the mean values given above the marginal effects of fiGM , iEE , and iFE , we obtain the results 
shown in Table 9. From them it turns out that an increase by 10% in the index of generalized mo-
rality decreases the probability of the average entrepreneur to be characterized by an index of mo-
rality equal, say, to 7 by about 3.68%.  On the contrary, the same percentage increase in general-
ized morality raises the probability of this entrepreneur to have an index of morality equal, say, to 
8 by 3.77%. This finding suggests that, when the index of morality of the average entrepreneur is 
relatively low, improvements in generalized morality reduce the probability of the index to re-
main at the given level, perhaps because then typical entrepreneurs tend to view such improve-
ments as occasions for resorting to opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, when the index of mo-
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rality for the average entrepreneur is relatively high, improvements in generalized morality raise the 
probability of the index to remain at the given level, perhaps because of the increased pressure on en-
trepreneurs to behave in morally transparent manners. Therefore the dilemma that emerges is how a 
society might switch from a regime of low to a regime of high entrepreneurial morality, since by 
themselves improvements in generalized morality may not be sufficient. In this regard, we consider 
the advice that Pope Benedict the XIV gave to Voltaire in their captioned dialogue exceedingly 
sound, because eventually the root of all morality has to do with the character of people. 
Equally enlightening with the above, but somewhat puzzling, are also the results with re-
spect to the next two variables in Table 9. From them it emerges that the effects of changes in the 
schools and in the family on the probability of entrepreneurial morality run in directions that de-
pend on the prevailing level of entrepreneurial morality. In particular, at low levels of the index 
iEM  improvements in the educational (family) environment contribute positively (negatively) to 
the probability that this index may remain at the given level, whereas at high levels the marginal 
effects are reversed. This finding contradicts partly our hypotheses H.1-H.2, because the indices 
of schooling and family environments were expected to influence the probability of the index of 
morality of the average entrepreneur in the same direction. But as we argued above, our model is 
not robust with respect to the signs of these variables since, had we chosen the estimates in which 
Table 9 
Marginal effects of independent variables  Index of morality 
iEM  fiGM  iEE  iFE  iLED  iPEP  iFPS  
2 -.00019 .00000 -.00002 .00000 -.00003  .00004 
3 -.00015 .00000 -.00001 .00000 -.00002  .00003 
4 -.00622  .00022 -.00053 .00014 -.00111  .00139 
5 -.05635  .00195 -.00482 .00129 -.01009  .01259 
6 -.20286  .00702 -.01735 .00465 -.03632  .04534 
7 -.36875  .01277 -.03154 .00845 -.06602  .08242 
8  .37691  .01305 -.03223 .00864 -.06748  .08425 
9 .08272 -.00286 .00707  -.00189  .01481 -.01849 
10 .67230 -.02328 .05750  -.01548    .12036 -.15027 
11 .24644 -.00853 .02108  -.00564  .04412 -.05508 
12 . 00946 -.00033 .00081  -.00021  .00169 -.00211 
13 . 00036 -.00001 .00003  -.00000  .00006 -.00008 
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the variables * * and i iLM GM  were treated as exogenous, the effects in question would run in uni-
son over similar values of iEM . Moreover, in the last three decades the environments of education 
and family in Greece have experienced so significant departures from traditional values, that it would 
be too demanding of the model to unscramble in a clear cut way the complexity of the influences that 
these two institutions exert on entrepreneurial morality. For this reason, in the expectation that at least 
their combined marginal effect might be uniform, we introduced in the estimations a variable com-
posed of the product of variables iEE  and iFE . Its coefficient though did not prove to be statistically 
different from zero and this explains its absence from the estimated model.  
Lastly, a few comments are in order regarding the remaining variables in Table 9. Refer-
ring first to iLED , observe that, as the index of morality of the typical entrepreneur increases, the 
marginal effects of the level of education turn from positive to negative. This implies that, 
whereas at a low level of entrepreneurial morality an improvement in education would influence 
positively the probability of iEM  for the average entrepreneur to retain its value, at a high level of 
entrepreneurial morality what transpires is exactly the opposite. Hence, after a certain level of 
entrepreneurial morality, education may be characterized by decreasing returns as a process for 
raising the probability of iEM  to attain higher threshold values. Next, notice from the column 
under iPEP  that the marginal effects of the size of firm, as measured by the number of its em-
ployees five years ago, turn from negative to positive as the values of the index of entrepreneurial 
morality increase. What this implies is that, in small countries with low entrepreneurial morality 
like Greece, gains in the average size of enterprises can not be expected to lead through increased 
transparency to gains in entrepreneurial morality, because the probabilities of iEM decline 
throughout the range from 2iEM =  to 8iEM = . Finally, observe from the last column of Table 9 
that the view of entrepreneurs regarding the factors that contribute to success in business, iFPS , 
influence entrepreneurial morality much like schooling, iEE , and the level of education, iLED , 
but with considerably stronger marginal effects. Hence, in countries with low entrepreneurial mo-
rality, one promising approach is to introduce arrangements through which entrepreneurs would 
be induced to shift the emphasis for their success in favor of such moral values as honesty, dili-
gence, trustworthiness, accountability, etc. 
In conclusion, localized and generalized morality, the schooling and the family environments, 
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the level of education, the size of the firm and the moral factors for success in business have emerged as 
significant determinants of entrepreneurial morality. Also, for small countries like Greece we found that 
the morality of the average entrepreneur: a) is far more likely to be low than high; b) may not be ex-
pected to improve with improvements in generalized morality and the size of enterprises, because at 
low levels of iEM  the marginal effects of these determinants would be negative and c) may be ex-
pected to improve with improvements in the level of education and particularly in the moral factors 
for success in business, because at low levels of iEM  their marginal effects would be positive. How-
ever, with regard to the marginal effects of schooling and family, our findings are uncertain mainly 
because the estimated model lacks robustness with respect to the signs of the respective variables.  
  
6. Synopsis, conclusions and suggestions for further research  
The bibliography that refers to the level and evolution of entrepreneurial morality focuses 
mainly on the behavior of managers in large enterprises. This is justified because in the devel-
oped countries a high percentage of GNP is produced by multi-product enterprises, in which 
groups such as employees, suppliers, bankers, shareholders, etc. hold significant economic stakes 
On the other hand, in many small countries the economies are dominated by enterprises in which 
ownership and control coincide in the same person, the entrepreneur.  In such countries entrepre-
neurial morality is determined not by the provisions and institutions of Corporate Governance, 
but by the processes that shape the character and the behavior of entrepreneurs. Unfortunately in 
this case the relevant bibliography is poor. This realization explains why we undertook this study, 
even though we knew from the very beginning that we would face many difficulties. 
To shed some light on the factors that determine entrepreneurial morality in small coun-
tries we employed the responses to a questionnaire from 1643 entrepreneurs in Greece. In the 
light of the well-known methodological difficulties that accompany such studies, we paid atten-
tion to procedures both before and after collecting the data. We trained and guided our university 
students to follow closely the criteria for selecting their samples of entrepreneurs and completing 
the questionnaire. In a pilot phase we tested and revised the structure of the questionnaire and the 
language used in the questions. When extracting from the questionnaires the variables we were 
careful with their definition and measurement. And last but not least, before estimating the 
model, we run tests for selectivity bias and common methods variance. Fortunately no remedies 
were required because these test showed that our data are free from such biases. However, in 
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view of the methodological uncertainties that beset studies based on questionnaires, we have con-
sidered it pertinent to offer our results not as evidence, but as indications about the determinants 
of entrepreneurial morality in small countries.    
In particular, our results showed that entrepreneurial morality is influenced significantly 
by localized and generalized morality, the educational and the family environments, the level of 
education of entrepreneurs, the size of firms and the moral factors that contribute to success in 
business. These findings confirm to a large extent the hypotheses H.1-H.4 and are in line with the 
perceptions that prevail among experts regarding the determinants of entrepreneurial morality. 
But by virtue of the estimates obtained from the model and the tests performed with it, we were 
able to quantify their independence and carry out analyses that have escaped so far the reach of 
researchers. More specifically, drawing on the calculations with the preferred model, we were 
able to conclude that for the average entrepreneur the probability of entrepreneurial morality to 
improve through changes in its determinants depend on the level of iEM . For, if this index were 
low, improvements in generalized morality and the level of education would increase its prob-
ability to improve, whereas if entrepreneurial morality were high, the marginal impact of such 
factors would be in the opposite direction.  
Finally, we should like to point out that our approach might be extended in various direc-
tions. One would be to investigate the evolution of entrepreneurial morality over time. Another, 
and very interesting one, would be to include entrepreneurs from countries with different lan-
guages, cultures, religions and entrepreneurial orientations, since in this way it would possible to 
differentiate their impact in entrepreneurial morality. Still another would be to investigate the role 
that the family plays in the conception and realization of entrepreneurial ideas.  
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Table 7 
Estimates of selection and outcome equations1 
Selection equation: 
Probit regression                                                 Number of obs    =       2287 
                                                                               LR chi2(4)       =     31.77 
                                                                                Prob > chi2     =   0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1343.6228                                            Pseudo R2       =   0.0117 
 
Participation                       Coef.              Std. Err.   z  P>z       [95% Conf. Interval] 
    
LEDi       .0550206 .0191762 2.87 0.004     .0174359 .0926053 
PEMi           .016815 .0048144 3.49 0.000       .007379 .0262509 
CEMi                 -.0077261 .0041366          -1.87 0.062    -.0158337 .0003815 
MESi       .0813582 .0406278 2.00 0.045     .0017292 .1609871 
Constant      .2136374 .0959474 2.23 0.026     .0255839   .401691 
     
Outcome Equation: 
Ordered probit regression              Number of obs    =         1643 
                   LR chi2(8)      =    1423.20 
                   Prob > chi2     =      0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2308.8269                                           Pseudo R2       =      0.2356 
 
iEM                   Coef.  Std. Err.    z P>z       [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 fiLM               -.3162398 .149593         -2.11 0.035    -.6094367         -.0230428 
fGMi    2.605012 .1579064       16.50 0.000     2.295521  2.914503 
EEi               -.0736688 .0475433        -1.55 0.121    -.1668519  .0195144 
FEi    .2259096 .0739049         3.06 0.002     .0810586  .3707606 
LEDi               -.0464788 .0224013        -2.07 0.038    -.0903845 -.0025731 
PEPi    .4646447 .0431825       10.76 0.000     .3800085  .5492808 
FPSi               -.5824393 .0252575      -23.06 0.000    -.6319431 -.5329355 
Lambda  .6917041 .6862886         1.01 0.314    -.6533969  2.036805 
/cut1   -3.67584 .7172997   -5.081722 -2.269959 
/cut2             -3.298136 .6448925   -4.562102   -2.03417 
/cut3             -2.334132 .5617162   -3.435075 -1.233188 
/cut4             -1.512267 .5392982   -2.569272 -.4552619 
/cut5             -.7921198 .5320731   -1.834964  .2507243 
/cut6             -.1326225 .5290416   -1.169525      .90428 
/cut7              .6233857 .5279375   -.4113528   1.658124 
/cut8              1.341318 .5272251     .3079762            .374661 
/cut9              2.537206 .5299624     1.498499  3.575913 
/cut10              3.917245 .5346242                 2.869401  4.965089 
/cut11              4.854838 .5384722     3.799451  5.910224 
  
Notes: 1.The new symbols appearing in this table have the following meanings: LEDi =Level of education;
PEMi =Employment 5 years ago; CEMi =Current employment; MESi = Moral encouragement in
schools; PEPi = Professional esteem when started; FPSi =Moral factors for professional success. 
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Table 8 
Estimates of model (12) with * * and i iLM GM  treated as endogenous and exogenous 
(12.1) * * and i iLM GM  treated as endogenous  
Ordered probit regression       Number of obs    =      1643 
              LR chi2(7)    = 1422.18 
             Prob > chi2    =   0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2309.3348          Pseudo R2     =   0.2354 
iEM       Coef.  Std. Err.    z P>z               [95%  Conf. Interval] 
f
iLM   -.3119064     .14953          -2.09 0.037          -.6049798           -.018833 
fGMi    2.609054 .1578496          16.53 0.000           2.299674          2.918433 
EEi   -.0903315 .0445771 -2.03 0.043            -.177701           -.002962 
FEi      .223136 .0738529  3.02 0.003           .0783871            .367885 
LEDi   -.0597959 .0180907           -3.31 0.001          -.0952531        -.0243388 
PEPi    .4671248 .0431118          10.84 0.000           .3826272          .5516225 
FPSi               -.5831686 .0252439         -23.10 0.000          -.6326456        -.5336916 
/cut1    -3.92178 .6764464             -5.247591         -2.59597 
/cut2  -3.539074 .5991198             -4.713327        -2.364821 
/cut3  -2.574551 .5085026             -3.571198        -1.577904 
/cut4  -1.753824 .4830386             -2.700562        -.8070858 
/cut5  -1.036492 .4735736             -1.964679        -.1083046 
/cut6  -.3789334 .4691843             -1.298518         .5406509 
/cut7   .3761158 .4674395                                        -.5400489           1.29228 
/cut8   1.094065 .4666426               .1794626         2.008668 
/cut9   2.290495 .4699912               1.369329           3.21166 
/cut10     3.67006 .4749581               2.739159         4.600961 
/cut11   4.607133   .479014               3.668283         5.545984 
(12.2) * * and i iLM GM  treated as exogenous  
Ordered probit regression           Number of obs   =         1643 
                                              LR chi2(7)  =   1168.65 
                                                                                             Prob > chi2  =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -2436.102                                                                   Pseudo R2  =     0.1935 
iEM                        Coef.           Std. Err.          z         P>z           [95%     Conf.     Interval] 
iLM                   .3674512           .0936273          3.92      0.000               .1839451           .5509574 
iGM                     .2444616           .0351523          6.95      0.000               .1755643           .3133589 
EEi                     -.1567948           .0440441        -3.56       0.000             -.2431196 -.0704699 
FEi                     -.1358638           .0694933        -1.96       0.051             -.2720683           .0003406 
LEDi                     -.039621           .0179172         -2.21      0.027               -.074738 -.0045041 
PEPi                       .072531           .0348004          2.08      0.037               .0043235 .1407385 
FPSi                   -.7213238            .0234793       -30.72     0.000              -.7673425 -.6753051 
/cut1                  -9.922086            .5283556                                              -10.95764 -8.886528 
/cut2                  -9.589491            .4436353                                                  -10.459 -8.719982 
/cut3                  -8.728449            .3306226                                              -9.376457 -8.08044 
/cut4                  -7.983007             2915492                                              -8.554433 -7.411581 
/cut5                  -7.279243            .2735564                                              -7.815404 -6.743083 
/cut6                  -6.654828            .2627575                                              -7.169823 -6.139833 
/cut7                  -5.955311            .2542143                                              -6.453562 -5.45706 
/cut8                  -5.289811            .2475721                                              -5.775043 -4.804579 
/cut9                  -4.211597            .2409489                                              -4.683848 -3.739346 
/cut10                -2.937776            .2371442                                                -3.40257 -2.472982 
/cut11          -2.04861            .2392557                                      -2.517543          -1.579678  
